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The conventional wisdom on European Parliament (EP) election campaigns is that they 
are second-order national contests (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh 1998; but see also 
Blondel et al 1998). That is, they are elections with low turnout that serve as referenda on 
current national governments rather than as a forum to discuss substantive European 
Union (EU) policy options or the performance of incumbent Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs). The European Union Studies Association newsletter’s account of the 
2004 campaign was entitled “ ‘Europe’: A Side Issue in European Parliamentary Election 
Campaigns” and summarized, “domestic issues and quarrels dominated electoral 
campaigns in all twenty-five member states” (Kauppi 2004). This finding is echoed by 
other authors who have studied EP campaigns in a range of countries, years, and party 
families (Andeweg 1995, Bardi 1996; Blondel et al 1998; Butler and Westlake, 1995, 
161-3; Lodge 1986, Lodge 1990, Lodge 1996, Lodge 2001, Sweeny 1984, van der Eijk 
and Franklin 1996).  
 
As a result of these nationally-oriented campaigns, voters vote in EP elections based on 
national-level criteria, not European issues (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). One reason 
why turnout in EP elections is low is that these contests appear to voters more an 
(unbinding) vote of confidence on the national government – where there is little 
substantive impact of the election outcome – rather than a race for a politically-salient 
European-level body. Chronic low turnout and lack of European content contributes to 
the oft-mentioned democratic deficit in the EU, because campaigns for the only directly 
elected European institution do not actually focus on the Parliament’s record or policy 
domain (Andeweg 1995; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Because national elections   3 
generally ignore these issues as well, there is no forum in which voters can register their 
preferences on policies within the EP’s ever-expanding purview.  
 
This paper seeks to explain the overwhelmingly national focus of European Parliament 
election campaigns. The first section reviews the plethora of oft-contradictory existing 
explanations for the national focus of EP campaigns, arguing that few of these 
explanations are both logically convincing and empirically supported. Second, the paper 
posits an alternative explanation for why parties may – or may not – choose to organize 
an EP election campaign around national rather than European themes. This alternative 
explanation predicts not only the primacy of national content in EP campaigns but also 
the exceptions to this rule – cases which other scholars write off as anomalies. The third 
section uses the 2004 EP campaigns by German political parties as a plausibility probe to 
investigate our hypotheses.   
 
I. Existing Explanations for the National Content of European Parliament Election 
Campaigns  
The most consistent observer of EP campaigns, Juliet Lodge, has produced edited 
volumes covering all six European elections and comes to virtually identical conclusions 
about the national focus of each: 
In 1979: [N]ational concerns dominate[d] the elections from the moment that member 
governments negotiated and then approved the provisions … to hold direct elections 
(Lodge 1982: 265). 
 
In 1984: [N]ational issues seemed to eclipse the Euro-dimension of the EP election 
(Lodge 1986, 258). 
   4 
In 1989: The 1989 Euro-elections were portrayed almost everywhere throughout the 
EC as referenda on national governments’ records (Lodge 1990, 1). 
 
In 1994: [N]ational issues dominated the agenda … major European issues were 
eclipsed (Lodge 1996, 9). 
 
In 1999: Criticism of the EU and Members of the European Parliament should have 
been the currency of the election debate. Constructive argument over policy options 
and possibilities should have assumed centre stage. Once again, they did not (Lodge 
2001, 3).
1 
 
 
Top-Down Explanations 
Many explanations for the continued national focus of EP campaigns have been but forth. 
For our purposes it is useful to classify them into top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
The former focus on the European Parliament itself as a factor causing the choice of 
campaign content. The latter focus on the architects of the campaigns themselves – agents 
within national political parties. Some of the earliest top-down attempts at explaining the 
national focus of EP campaigns dealt with public perceptions of the Parliament. The first 
two sets of elections were set against a backdrop of low public knowledge about the EP 
and about the existence of direct elections (Lodge 1982). In 1984, in some countries less 
than a quarter of the electorate realized EP elections were going to be held (Lodge 1986: 
19). In this setting Lodge concluded, “It is perhaps not surprising that national issues 
seemed to eclipse the Euro-dimension to the EP election and that party elites (because of 
ignorance or desperation) tried to enliven the debate and make it intelligible by putting it 
in national terms” (1986: 258; see also Lodge 1982: 265). A campaign focused on the EP 
seemed unlikely to inspire many voters.  
 
                                                 
1 Lodge’s volume on the 2004 elections has not yet appeared in print.   5 
While this explanation seems plausible, it is not confirmed by empirical evidence. While 
the national bent to EP campaigns is found across the Union, studies of European public 
opinion found widespread national differences in terms of both knowledge of the 
European Parliament and approval of the parliament across the member states 
(Niedermayer 1991, Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995, Gabel 2003). If public knowledge of, 
or support for, the EP were to determine the degree of European focus to EP campaigns, 
we would instead observe varying degrees of “Europeanness” to EP campaigns 
correlating to national variance in public attitudes and knowledge. As will be discussed 
below, there are some occasions when EP campaigns take on a European hue, and this 
trend often occurs in the United Kingdom. UK citizens, however, consistently have low 
levels of knowledge about the EP and an unfavorable impression of it (Niedermayer 
1991, Gabel 2003) – the opposite of what this hypothesis would expect. 
 
A second top-down theory about the cause nationally-oriented EP campaigns focused not 
on popular knowledge about the Parliament but on its actual power. Because the 
European Parliament lacked power, some observers claimed, there was little reason to 
focus on the EP in elections because not as much was at stake at European level as in 
national politics (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Given the limited power of the EP in 1979 
when the first direct elections were held, this thesis seemed plausible. Since then, 
however, the Parliament’s power has significantly increased (Kreppel 2002; Hix, Raunio, 
and Scully 2003), but the content of European electoral campaigns has remained 
stubbornly national in tone (Andeweg 1995). Indeed, although European issues have   6 
become more important to national political parties over time, this importance has not 
manifested itself in the campaign themes that these parties choose (Ray 1999).  
 
More recently, others have argued that the second-order national election character of 
European campaigns persists because EP elections still do not change the executive 
make-up of the European Union (Blondel et al, 1998: 16; Bardi, 1996: 100). As a result, 
some observers recommend electing a President or giving EP power over the executive as 
a way to make European elections more “European” in character (van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1996). The content of European campaigns did not change much when the EP 
received the power to approve the Commission or when it influenced the Commission to 
resign, however, so it is unclear whether such a change in election’s relationship to the 
executive would have a large impact either.  
 
Furthermore, analysis of public opinion reveals that voters systematically overestimate 
the power of the Parliament, viewing it as much more similar to national parliaments than 
it actually is (Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995: 291). This also makes it unlikely that 
greater powers for the parliament would change the national nature of European 
campaigns. Moreover, the European public has clearly perceived the increase in the 
Parliament’s power (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995: 294), but the nature of European 
electoral campaigns have not changed as the Parliament has.  
 
Still others argue that the electoral system used in European elections makes a campaign 
on European issues difficult. Initially, “the absence of a common electoral law, common   7 
election day, common parties capable of contesting the elections, common provisions 
regarding voter eligibility… meant that the elections were largely construed as national 
elections to select Members to represent national interests” (Lodge 1982: 265). Later 
observers stressed that because fewer, and hence larger, electoral districts are used in EP 
elections, it is difficult for parties to foster personal connections between MEPs and the 
electorate (Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton, 1992, 19), so better-known members of the 
national parliaments assumed prominence in the campaigns. This has led some to favor 
proposals for electoral system change (Katz and Wessels, 1999: 216-7; van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1996: 379-80), including voting on a Tuesday or voting electronically (Lodge 
2001).
2 In fact, in 1999 a common system of proportional representation was introduced 
for European elections to promote greater “European-ness.” EP election campaigns in 
1999 and 2004 remained nationally-oriented, however. Furthermore, the Netherlands 
which has no difference in district size between national and European elections still sees 
very nationally-oriented EP campaigns.  
 
There is, however, one component of the European electoral system that does seem 
fruitful in explaining the nationally-focused campaigns. All EP electoral districts are 
within a single country and, while transnational party federations write election 
manifestos and initially conducted voter-education campaigns, actual decisions about the 
content of European elections are made by national-level parties in a national arena.
3 As 
Simon Hix and Christopher Lord (1997: 84) put it, “The selection of candidates, the 
arguments of the campaign, electoral success or failure, and the label under which an 
                                                 
2 See also Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton, 1992, Chapter 2 for a history of attempts at European electoral 
reform. 
3 In 2004 the Green party family for the first time conducted similar Europe-wide campaigns.   8 
MEP is elected are … governed by domestic party politics….” If, as some proponents of 
electoral reform propose, transnational party federations were to control candidate 
selection and if voters would have to vote for European-wide or at least transnational 
lists, the focus of EP election campaigns would surely transcend national issues. While 
this is undoubtedly the case, it cannot explain why, given the current conditions, national 
parties choose to campaign on national rather than European issues.  
 
Bottom-Up Theories 
Rather than focusing on the EP as an institution to explain the content of EP election 
campaigns, as do the arguments outlined above, it is more fruitful to look at those who 
actually conduct the European election and examine their motives for choosing campaign 
themes. Just as with the top-down approach, there are a number of bottom-up hypotheses 
which seek to explain the behavior of national political actors.  
 
When the first direct elections to the Parliament failed to produce European-centered 
campaigns, some observers simply blamed national political actors’ ignorance of, or 
disdain for, the EP or the EU itself. Van der Eijk and Franklin claim the “myopia of 
national party leaders” blinds them to European themes (1996: 10). Lodge criticized,  
Parties can hardly expect to mobilize the electorate … if they do not imbue their 
activists first with a sense of the EP’s importance and legitimacy… countering 
ignorance of both the EC and the EP’s functions, powers and role…. [I]t is all too 
obvious that national governments by and large treat both the EP and the 
Commission… with scarcely concealed contempt. Thus national political elites 
appear to lack respect for the EC. It is not surprising then that some should make only 
a token effort to get out the vote in Euro-elections. Nor is it surprising that their 
campaigns should then come to focus (by design, accident, or simple neglect) on 
highly visible national issues…. (1986, 260). 
   9 
While this might have been the case in the early years of direct elections, the growth in 
competencies not only of the Parliament but also of the EU itself, and the European Court 
of Justice in particular, it is difficult to believe that national parties across the twenty-four 
member states still remain ignorant of the EU or lack respect for its role.
4  
 
It has also been argued that it is not national parties’ lack of respect, but fear, of the EP 
that causes national parties to avoid European issues in Euro-campaigns. Lodge attributed 
nationally-focused campaigns in Euro-skeptic Denmark and the UK to efforts of the 
parties to reassure voters that a directly elected EP would not try to usurp national 
parliaments’ powers (Lodge 1986, 3). Again, however, while this might be true of some 
Euro-skeptic parties it is unlikely to explain campaigning trends of most parties across 
the Union. 
 
More recently Mair put forth the hypothesis that parties prefer to avoid discussing issues 
determined by European-level institutions in European elections so that “the party 
leaderships which emerge victorious from the contests… have the capacity to remain 
relatively insulated from electoral constraints and enjoy a relatively free hand to develop 
their appropriate policy alternatives as they themselves see fit” (2000, 47-8). If national 
parties’ motivation for stressing national issues in EP campaigns were indeed to protect 
their freedom of maneuver, this strategy would seem to have backfired. The national 
focus of EP campaigns has created a situation where Euro-elections are interpreted as 
referenda on the incumbent government; this has opened national governments up to 
additional opportunities for voters to criticize their domestic performance and paved the 
                                                 
4 Indeed, as will be outlined below, there is a strong pro-Europe consensus across most mainstream parties.   10 
way for new competitors in their party systems (Hix and Lord, 1997, 89-90; see 
contributions to van der Eijk and Franklin 1996).  
  
Other scholars have put forth arguments suggesting it is not ignorance, fear, or ill will 
that causes party leaders to stress national themes in EP election campaigns, but an 
inability to make European issues come alive with voters. Blondel et al write, “European 
issues have little salience…. At the 1994 elections, for instance, efforts were made by 
some to give a European-wide profile to some questions such as the situation in former 
Yugoslavia or unemployment: the first of these matters was quickly shown to raise little 
interest while the second was not sufficiently orchestrated, for whatever reasons, and 
never had a real impact as a European-wide problem” (1998: 15-16). It strains the 
imagination, however, to believe that issues surrounding jobs or war cannot be made 
interesting to the public. If national parties can frame these issues in national terms in a 
national election, it seems highly likely that if they so desired they could also do so in a 
European election, especially given the growing reliance of national parties on 
professional advertising agencies which can seemingly sell anything to anyone (Farrell 
and Webb 2000; for Germany in 2004 see Grabow 2004).  
 
Rather than assuming that political parties – shown to be relatively rational actors in the 
domestic arena – are somehow incompetent when it comes to running a European 
election campaign, it seems more fruitful to examine what rational reasons domestic 
actors might have to avoid European themes in an EP campaign. To date, three 
contrasting views have been brought forth to explain the way in which national parties   11 
across Europe view European issues. Each implies a different reason as to why domestic 
party leaders would want to avoid European themes in an EP campaign.  
 
The first of these schools of thought argues that there is widespread consensus on 
European issues in the court of European public opinion. As early as 1970 Lindberg and 
Scheingold observed what they called a “permissive consensus” among the European 
electorate; they described “generally favorable orientations among elites and mass 
publics toward a broad range of integrative activities. This support seemed to be 
increasing as the Community developed” (p. 250). Against this backdrop, some argued, 
mainstream western European parties by and large agree over the issue of European 
integration. Mair (2000) found 66.4% of the vote in the EU of 15 going to parties 
“strongly pro-European integration” and only 8% of the electorate supporting “strongly 
anti-European integration” parties.
5 The remainder voted for parties with ambivalent 
stances vis-à-vis Europe. Ray’s 1999 expert opinion survey also concluded that parties 
had begun taking increasingly pro-European integration stances. Schmitt and Thomassen 
find that the main party groups represented in the EP have a good degree of consensus on 
European issues as well (1999, 206).  
 
As a result, this school of thought argues, most political parties do not stress European 
integration in either their national or European electoral campaigns (Blondel et al, 1998, 
16). Few votes are to be gained by stressing a valence issue (Lange and Davidson-
Schmich 1995). While this explanation seems plausible as to why parties might not 
debate the issue of European integration or the existence of the EU, there still are many 
                                                 
5 See Taggert (1998) for a discussion of such parties.   12 
areas of disagreement among parties as to the content of EU policies – what role should 
the EU play in protecting workers from the vagaries of globalization, attracting 
international investment, or regulating immigration, particularly from Islamic countries? 
It is hard to imagine widespread cross-partisan agreement on such issues. Furthermore, 
the literature on EP election campaigns consistently notices that at some times some 
parties – especially but not exclusively in the UK and Denmark – do stress European 
issues (For a few of many examples see Hix and Lord, 1997: 91-2; Lodge 1986: 256; van 
der Eijk and Franklin 1996: 367; Jacobs, Corbett, Shackleton, 1992, 28). This line of 
thinking can explain the fact that UK and Danish EP elections do focus on European 
issues. In Denmark a different party system is used for EP elections due to the presence 
of anti-EU parties that do not contest national elections. In the UK the electorate is 
widely Euro-skeptic. Because voters in these countries are so divided over Europe, it is 
not a valence issue and thus a logical issue for domestic parties to include in their 
campaigns (see case studies in Blondel et al 1996, Lange and Davidson-Schmich 1995). 
However, this approach cannot explain why parties in other countries with a widespread 
pro-integration consensus might at times address European issues in an EP campaign. 
 
 A second and contrasting line of reasoning regarding political parties’ views of European 
integration has also been brought forth. This school of thought argues that political 
parties fail to stress European integration in campaigns not because of widespread pro-
European sentiment but because their membership is divided on the issue. As a result, 
party elites play down “Europe” in campaigns to downplay division within the party (van 
der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Hix 1999). This hypothesis clearly applies to some parties   13 
within Europe (Hix 1999, Taggert 1998) – most famously the British Conservative Party 
– but the level of (dis)agreement over European integration varies widely among parties 
and most parties are relatively united (Ray 1999). So while this explanation can shed 
light on why some parties might want to avoid European issues, it cannot explain why on 
the whole EP election campaigns are national in tone. 
 
II. An Alternative Explanation  
 
In order to understand parties’ decisions about European election campaign content, a 
third approach is more useful. This approach to national parties’ stances on Europe, 
spearheaded by Gary Marks and fellow researchers, argues that rather than being 
consistently divided over, or united on, European integration, party families have distinct 
stances on Europe that differ from country to country depending on the social and 
historical cleavages present (Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks, Wilson, and Ray 2002; 
Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson, 2002; see also Ladrech (1999) and van der Brug and van der 
Eijk (1999, 153) on transnational parties). Research in this school of thought is based on 
a broader definition of what constitutes “European” issues than are the above two 
schools. Thomassen and Schmitt’s (1999) three-fold typology of European issues 
clarifies this point. First, there is the question of national sovereignty vs. power for the 
European Union. Second, if power is to be given to the EU, what form should the latter 
assume? In other words, what roles should be played by the Commission, the Parliament, 
and the Council? It is to these two types of questions that the above schools of thought 
refer. The widespread pro-European consensus among mainstream parties mentioned   14 
above refers primarily to the desirability of transferring certain powers to certain actors. 
Similarly, the divisions in parties such as the Tories result when the electorate (or party) 
is split on the desirability of integration as a whole.  
 
Once integration is assumed (or actually occurs), however, a whole new range of 
“European” issues emerge. Thomassen and Schmitt explain, “Once the Union has the 
competence to pursue its own policies in a particular area, the question remains what the 
content of that policy should be. Suddenly, the relevant conflict dimensions do not 
necessarily differ from those at the national level” (1999, 259). Social Democratic parties 
can be expected to use the European level to push for greater protections for workers in a 
globalizing economy, parties of the right to push for greater liberalization, and Green 
parties to use the EU as a platform for greater environmental regulations (Hooghe, 
Marks, and Wilson 2002).  
 
Given the presence of such profound partisan differences over the uses to which the EU 
should be put, arguments that EP campaigns do not focus on European issues because 
parties do not understand or respect the EU, or that European issues are boring or 
uncontroversial, do not seem plausible. While some parties may prefer to avoid 
discussing the EU because they are divided over its very desirability, this is clearly not 
the case for most political parties. Another explanation is needed. Our belief is that most 
parties could potentially benefit from discussing Thomassen and Schmitt’s third type of 
European issue in an EP campaign and that most parties could clearly articulate 
compelling positions on such issues to voters if they chose to do so.     15 
 
So why do national campaigns usually fail to focus on European issues? Our explanation 
is a relatively mundane one: the national parties that plan EP election campaigns are in 
business to win elections and there are more national elections than European ones. In 
addition, the more that EP elections come to be seen as a key part of national politics, the 
more pressure parties are under to focus on being as competitive as possible in terms of 
national issues (Hix and Lord, 1997: 90). From national parties’ perspectives, it is more 
efficient to spend limited resources fighting on national issues because this kills two birds 
with one stone. Why should party organizations waste time on EU issues when they can 
campaign in EP elections on national issues and still win seats in the Parliament?
6  
 
We expect that the only parties choosing to stress European themes in their EP campaigns 
are those who prefer to avoid discussing domestic issues and believe they can better win 
votes in national elections by stressing European issues and/or diverting voters’ attention 
from the national arena. There are several instances in which a party might make such a 
calculation.  
n  When a party’s raison d’etre is to oppose integration. I.e., when it has no 
domestic platform to campaign on or when it is severely divided on domestic 
questions (See Taggert 1998). 
n  When a party has a stance on Europe that differentiates it from virtually all other 
mainstream domestic parties. Since most European parties are pro-European 
integration, such a stance is usually overt opposition to European integration. 
                                                 
6 Eventually the situation could reach a tipping point; if all other parties campaign on European issues and 
one party tries to skirt them, this party could be punished by voters. But that certainly is not the case at the 
moment.    16 
Stressing this theme helps such parties gain votes from the anti-European segment 
of the electorate as well as protest votes.
7  
n  When a large party is far from a national election, especially when the party is an 
incumbent whose domestic record is not strong or a large opposition party facing 
a popular incumbent. This hypothesis is drawn from van der Eijk and Franklin 
(1996) whose research shows that large parties far from a national election tend to 
suffer most in EP elections when these elections are perceived by voters as 
referenda on the incumbent government. Such contests offer voters a “safe” 
opportunity to punish large mainstream parties by voting for protest parties. If 
large parties can convince voters that EP elections deal with serious European 
issues they may be less inclined to view EP contests as opportunities for rebellion.  
n  When a party’s domestic organization and/or stances are more unpopular than its 
European side.  
n  When a particular European issue is so contentious among the electorate that the 
issue is at the forefront of domestic politics and therefore needs to be addressed if 
a party is to succeed nationally. 
 
Since the first two of these conditions usually apply only to small parties, the third 
condition only at times to large parties, and the last two conditions only irregularly, the 
primary thrust of EP election campaigns can be expected to be national. This framework 
does, however, provide a rationale for the occasional use of European themes in an EP 
campaign, and does not dismiss such incidents as inexplicable anomalies. 
                                                 
7 See contributions to van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) for examples of how EP elections have allowed 
such parties to gain ground in domestic party systems using this tactic.   17 
 
The following section provides a plausibility probe to see whether these hypotheses hold 
up in the face of empirical evidence from one recent EP election campaign: that held in 
Germany in 2004. 
  
III. Empirical Evidence 
 
This case was chosen because it is a textbook example of an EP election campaign in 
terms of turnout, results, campaign intensity, and campaign themes.
8 Turnout was the 
lowest ever in a post-war German national election (43%) and in keeping with the low 
participation endemic to EP elections (Güllner 2004). The largest incumbent party, the 
Social Democrats (SPD), were punished severely, receiving only 21.5% of the vote, 
down from 30.7% in 1999. This was their worst showing in the post-war period. The 
largest opposition party, the Christian Democrats, did not lose as much, but their vote 
share fell 2.8% from the 39.3% they received in 1999. In contrast, small and/or extreme 
parties including the Greens, the liberal Free Democrats (FDP), and the far right did quite 
well. The Greens were seen as the big winner of the elections. In the city of Freiburg they 
received their best showing ever, 36.8%, and in the state of Berlin they were the second 
largest party (“Union grübelt” 2004). Nationally, they increased their vote from 6.4% in 
1999 to 11.9%. In contrast to 1999, the FDP broke Germany’s 5% threshold and received 
representation in the EP, increasing their vote share from 3% to 6.1%. The far-right 
                                                 
8 One drawback to the German case is that there are no longer any German parties which exist primarily to 
oppose the EU, as did the Pro-DM party before the adoption of the Euro. Thus we are unable to test our 
hypothesis regarding such parties. The Danish experience – and pure logic – suggest, however, that parties 
that exist solely to oppose the EU will virtually always campaign on European rather than domestic themes.   18 
Republikaner and National Democratic Party (NDP) saw their combined share of the 
electorate rise from 2.1% in 1999 to 2.8%.
9 The former East German communists, the 
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), improved slightly from 5.8% in 1999 to 6.1%. An 
additional 9.1% of the vote was divided among a collection of sixteen other lists 
including the Animal Rights Party, The Grays (die Grauen), and The Women (die 
Frauen). Gains for small or extreme parties and losses for large ones have been typical of 
EP elections since their inception (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996) and were again the 
rule across Europe in 2004.  
 
By all accounts, the German campaign was quite lackluster, as is typical of European 
contests. Media accounts stressed the campaign’s “dull” (Weiland 2004) nature, the 
“especially low” (Hermann 2004) level of voter interest, and expected low turnout 
(Schaeffer 2004). Indeed, German parties spent only one tenth of what they spend on 
national election campaigns on their 2004 EP campaigns (Grabow 2004). In terms of the 
overall content, as is the rule in European elections, one typical journalist observed, 
“there are hardly and real European themes – the election is seen by the parties as more 
of a barometer measuring domestic sentiment” (Tillack 2004). Interviews with the 
mainstream parties’ campaign managers confirm that they believed they could win votes 
in the EP election by stressing national issues. They viewed European elections as an 
opportunity to field test the campaign themes and techniques they planned to use in the 
2006 national elections. For this reason, top party leaders, the parties’ regular advertising 
agencies, and their professional media consultants all took part in running campaigns 
(Grabow 2004). Nonetheless, the campaigns received limited coverage in the major 
                                                 
9 Several other very minor lists of far-right candidates increased the overall total to 3.5% (Langenau 2004).   19 
newsmagazines and newspapers. In the Spiegel, Focus, and Germany’s newspaper of 
record, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, there was almost as much coverage of EP 
campaigns in other countries as there was of the German parties’ campaigns. What 
coverage there was was often insubstantial. A website featuring pictures of all German 
EP candidates and an opportunity for voters choose the best-looking candidate received 
extensive media attention – and 900,000 hits – while party platforms did not 
(www.politik-digital.de/kand-o-mat/).    
 
However, an examination of the main parties’ platforms, a close reading of their detailed 
campaign materials, and attention to the (limited) media attention their platforms 
received
10, are warranted here in light of the contrasting assumptions about national 
parties’ stances vis-à-vis European integration. As expected by observers in the 
“permissive consensus” camp, there was a widespread consensus among the mainstream 
German parties that European integration was desirable (Grabow 2004) and that the EP 
should receive more powers to influence the Union’s executive (“Wie sieht” 2004). Only 
the extreme right in Germany was overtly opposed to the EU. As a result, there was no 
widespread discussion in Germany of the first type of European issue (whether the EU 
was desirable) nor was there widespread discussion of the second type of issue (i.e., the 
Parliament’s role within the Union’s political system). 
 
In contrast to the expectation that national parties are divided over the issue of Europe, 
mainstream German parties were by and large united over most of the European issues 
discussed above and to be discussed below. The only exception to this rule regarded the 
                                                 
10 For an especially thorough overview, see “Wer was” 2004.   20 
highly controversial issue of whether the European Council should open accession 
negotiations with Turkey. The Christian Democrats came out primarily against full-
fledged EU membership for Ankara, instead calling for a partnership that would fall short 
of membership. Former CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Ex-Defense Minister Volker 
Rühe, who had favored Turkish accession while in office, disagreed. The Liberals too 
came out against Turkish membership, although their former Foreign Ministers Genscher 
and Kinkel were in favor (“Die Menschen” 2004). The leftist parties including the Social 
Democrats, Greens, and PDS all favored Turkish EU membership if/when the 
Copenhagen criteria are met, although some members of these parties, including former 
SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, vocally disagreed with their party’s overall stance 
(Schneider 2004). As a result of these divisions, none of the mainstream parties planned 
to focus on the Turkish issue in their campaigns (Grabow 2004); however, as will be 
discussed below, this topic proved difficult to avoid in practice.  
 
Aside from this broad pro-integration consensus and the divisions over Turkey, German 
parties had clear-cut stances on a range of European issues, stances with which by-and-
large most party members agreed and which were quite different from party to party. As 
expected by Marks et al, the parties disagreed on major issues confronting the European 
Parliament in much the same way they disagree on domestic issues. For example, the 
parties disagreed over the question of whether the EU should require member states to 
have a minimum tax rate to prevent “tax dumping” being used to lure foreign investment 
(“Zu niedrige” 2004). The Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and former 
communists all agreed on the need for a minimum tax rate while the Greens believed, at   21 
least in the short run, low tax rates in Eastern Europe were justified because they helped 
new member states’ economies. The liberals Free Democrats vigorously defended 
European-wide competition to attract investment and staunchly opposed any attempts to 
set a minimum tax rate. Similar disagreements arose over questions regarding the 
percentage of the EU’s budget to be devoted to internal and external security. The CDU 
called for more spending on police, border guards, and for the creation of a European 
army; the FPD agreed on the latter point. Parties of the left, including the SPD, Greens, 
and PDS, all stressed a more peaceful EU foreign policy including the creation of a 
civilian peace corps. The former communists further called for the end of EU military 
spending in favor of foreign aid to address the sources of global unrest (“Gemeinsame” 
2004). Finally, the parties disagreed over agricultural issues. The Christian Democrats 
and PDS strongly favored continued high agricultural subsidies in the EU’s budget, the 
SPD and Greens favored drastic reductions to these subsidies, and the Liberals called for 
funds to be taken away from agriculture and put toward higher education as well as 
toward research and development (“Wie viel” 2004).  
 
Three of the major parties’ lists were headed by veteran MEPs whose records in the 
Parliament could have been addressed in the campaign (“Who is who” 2004). Hans-Gert 
Pöttering, the Christian Democrats’ lead candidate, has been an MEP since the first direct 
elections and has served as the head of the European People’s Party-European 
Democrats’ parliamentary party group, the largest in the EP. Some consider him a 
candidate for higher EU office in the future. During the campaign he made over eighty 
public appearances; however, he was regularly overshadowed by Angela Merkel, the   22 
CDU’s national party leader, who usually appeared at his side. The SPD’s lead candidate, 
Martin Schulz, was similarly well known for his disputes with Silvio Berlusconi in the 
Parliament, in which Berlusconi recommended a film role for Schulz as a concentration 
camp guard. The PDS’s lead candidate, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, had served as an MEP 
since 1999 and was active in drafting the EU constitution. Again, however, these MEPs’ 
records were completely ignored in the campaign.
11 The Greens’ lead candidate, Rebecca 
Harms, served as a staff member for a Green MEP between 1984 and 1989, but less was 
made of this role than her role as an anti-nuclear activist in Lower Saxony’s state 
legislature. The Liberals’ lead candidate, Silvana Koch-Mehrin, who had no experience 
in the Parliament, did receive considerable media attention and will be discussed below. 
 
In addition to these European issues directly in the EP’s purview, there were several other 
European-level issues over which German parties clearly disagreed. On the question of 
when citizens from the new EU member states should be allowed to work in Germany, 
the Christian Democrats favored pushing this date seven years into the future, the latest 
date established by the federal government. In contrast, Social Democrats and Greens 
called for speeding up this timetable and allowing eastern workers to come to Germany in 
2006. The Liberals and PDS called for immediate approval of their working in Germany 
(“Wann sollen” 2004).  
 
                                                 
11 A close look at detailed SPD campaign material found brief references to the EP’s success in keeping 
soccer matches off pay-per-view TV and in protecting consumers’ rights when travel plans went awry or 
when purchased goods were defective. Similarly, PDS party newsletters stressed the roles played by all six 
of the parties’ MEPs. These messages were not widely publicized, however.     23 
The parties also disagreed both over the content of the European Constitution and over 
the process Germany should use to ratify it (“Europa” 2004). The former communists 
opposed the current version of the constitution, deeming it too militaristic (Bortfeldt 
2004), the Greens believed it should be passed but then significantly amended, while the 
other parties agreed more or less on its contents. The Christian Democrats called for a 
mention of Germany’s Judeo-Christian tradition in the constitution whereas the Social 
Democrats, Liberals, and former communists opposed this formulation. The Greens 
called for a compromise wording mentioning “god” in the preamble, but not specifying 
which one. Finally, the Liberals and the PDS called for a national referendum on the 
constitution, the Greens for a European-wide plebiscite, the SPD remained ambiguous 
calling only for its “speedy adoption,” and the CDU explicitly rejected a referendum.  
 
The above discussion makes clear that, with the notable exception of Turkey, German 
party members were relatively united when it came to European issues.
12 Furthermore, 
the parties disagreed in significant ways over these issues. Public opinion polls showed 
that 74% of voters believed Germany’s ability to preserve its welfare state was a “very 
important” or “important” political issue and 73% of the electorate identified the war in 
Iraq as such. Both issues had direct connections to the economic and security-related 
issues mentioned above. Further, almost half of the electorate (49%) believed the 
aforementioned Turkish question was an important one. Thus European issues were not 
ones which were uninteresting or foreign to German voters (Weiland 2004). Finally, most 
parties had lead candidates with European experience whose records could have been a 
                                                 
12 The FDP’s former Foreign Minister Dietrich Genscher, however, opposed his party on the question of a 
referendum for the EU constitution.   24 
campaign issue. Thus, if they had chosen to, German parties could have easily mounted 
an effective electoral campaign focusing on European issues.      
 
However, these parties’ campaign strategies, with some exceptions as expected by the 
hypotheses above, generally focused on domestic issues. Most European of all were the 
campaigns run by the extreme right. As these parties had significantly different stances 
on Europe in comparison with the mainstream parties, this focus helped them carve a 
unique niche for themselves both in national and European politics. The Republicans 
sought to call attention to a newly-released expose by a former Spiegel journalist 
exposing MEP’s extensive perks (Gottlied and Carvajal 2004, Carvajal and Gottlieb 
2004). Their main poster
13 stated boldly, “Stop the Rip-offs.” This slogan went along 
well with their platform calling for reducing MEPs’ salaries, keeping political power in 
national parliaments rather than giving it to Brussels, maintaining the primacy of national 
law, and returning to the Deutsche Mark. The rip-off slogan also served double duty in 
that it reminded voters that Berlin is a net payer into the EU and other countries receive 
more benefits than Germany. A second Republican poster featured the slogan “Europe 
without Turkey.” This set them apart from even the Christian Democrats who favored 
some type of partnership with Turkey. The other main far right party, the National 
Democratic Party (NDP), focused their campaign against Turkish EU-accession in an 
overtly racist manner. Their main campaign slogan was “Germans Defend Yourselves” – 
the same slogan used by the Nazis in 1933 in conjunction with their boycott of Jewish 
businesses. This slogan was accompanied by the image of an Islamic crescent eclipsing 
                                                 
13 Although German parties receive free TV time following the evening news on public television, all 
German parties viewed posters on billboards as their most important campaign activity. This was followed 
by public meetings and newspaper coverage (Grabow 2004).   25 
the EU’s circle of stars, set against a backdrop of burning cities, police cars, and 
minarets. These parties’ willingness to overtly criticize Europe and express anti-Islamic 
sentiment set them apart from the mainstream parties and this focus on European issues 
proved a good way to capture protest votes in the EP election. The Republican’s 
campaign newsletter was even entitled “Time for Protest.” 
  
The other main party stressing European over national issues was the incumbent Social 
Democratic Party. After six years under Chancellor Schroeder, who barely won a second 
term in 2002, Germany’s chronic unemployment had not improved and many within his 
own party opposed Schroeder’s attempts to liberalize the German economy. Any 
attention paid to domestic issues was likely be detrimental to the SPD, so the party 
attempted to divert the public’s opinion to the European level. The director of one of 
Germany’s leading polling agencies called the campaign strategy, “a desperate attempt by 
the SPD to do damage control” (Bennhold 2004). This tactic was similar to that pursued 
by the SPD in 2002 when Schroeder successfully whipped up anti-American, anti-war 
sentiment over the U.S. invasion of Iraq. As a result, the SPD’s primary campaign slogan 
was “Friedensmacht” or “a power for peace” and its poster campaign repeatedly stressed 
the word peace. The party decided not to picture the unpopular Schroeder on the posters 
(Hermann 2004).     
  
The SPD had not planned to stress the Turkey issue, in part because the relationship 
between ethnic Germans and those of Turkish descent are quite tense in Germany and 
because there is widespread anti-Turkish sentiment among the SPD’s working class   26 
constituents (“Generalprobe” 2004). Nonetheless, the Turkey issue came up repeatedly in 
the campaign. One of the top SPD candidates for the EP was the naturalized German 
citizen of Turkish origin, Vural Oeger, the head of a large tour bus company and an 
outspoken proponent of Turkish EU-accession. In May, Oeger made public comments 
suggesting that German families should have more children to solve Germany’s 
demographic crisis. These remarks immediately prompted outrage from the right, leading 
to comments about Oeger having a harem and criticisms both of Turkish immigrants’ 
treatment of women and of their failure to “integrate” into German society (“Die wollen” 
2004). This conflict made headlines, as did the far right’s campaign, and most media 
attention given to the campaign came to focus on the issue of Turkey’s future in the EU 
and the parties’ attitudes toward Turks living in Germany. While the SPD did not intend 
for this to be a key campaign issue, the party was ultimately happy to send Oeger – rather 
than their lead candidate – to talk shows and other public appearances to divert attention 
from national issues.  
 
Both the incumbent Greens and the opposition Free Democrats claimed to run European-
focused campaigns (Grabow 2004) and after their strong showing in the EP elections, 
both claimed their Euro-focused campaigns were the cause of their electoral success 
(“Schwere” 2004; “SPD erleidet” 2004). The FDP had strategic domestic reasons for 
stressing European issues in their campaign – their domestic leadership was divided, 
scandal-ridden and unpopular. In contrast, their top European candidate Sylvana Koch-
Mehrin, was popular (and considered very attractive – she ranked 4
th in the on-line 
appearance poll). A young blonde working mother, Koch-Mehrin studied in Paris,   27 
married an Irishman, and worked in Brussels in a consulting firm devoted to helping 
companies comply with EU regulations. She was never active in the German FDP but 
instead in the party’s ex-patriot organization in Brussels. With her multi-cultural business 
background, Koch-Mehrin embodied both European and liberal ideals. By placing Koch-
Mehrin on posters and arranging frequent media exposure, the FDP was able to run a 
European campaign simply on the basis of personality.
14 In addition to pictures of their 
lead candidate, however, the FDP ran on the slogan “We can do Europe better!” – better, 
assumedly than the incumbent domestic government. Both the party and Koch-Mehrin 
consistently criticized the level of bureaucracy present in Brussels. This strategy 
successfully allowed the liberals to divert attention from their lackluster domestic party 
leaders but still stress their core domestic theme: neo-liberal economic policies. 
 
While the Greens claimed to run a purely European-focused campaign and much was 
made of the pan-European organization of the Greens’ EP campaign, a closer look at the 
German Greens’ campaign reveals it to have quite a mixed focus. On the one hand, one 
of their most common posters featured a large picture of Joshka Fischer, the Green 
Foreign Minister and one of Germany’s most popular politicians. As Fischer was not an 
MEP candidate, this poster was clearly national in scope. Another such poster featured an 
unflattering picture of CDU leader Angela Merkel along with Silvio Berlusconi with 
slogan “you decide!” On the other hand, further Green posters did feature overtly 
European themes including one with Gerhard Schroeder, Tony Blair, and Françios 
Mitterrand’s faces atop skeletons and the slogan “for more transparency.” Another 
                                                 
14 EP campaigns are often criticized for a lack of substance because they focus on personalities such as porn 
stars or racecar drivers. Koch-Mehrin provided a substantive contrast – a popular personality with a 
political platform.   28 
internationally-focused poster similar to the SPD’s had multiple versions of the same 
photo of George Bush and the slogans “don’t give clones a chance.” While the remainder 
of the Green campaign can be considered European in that it did not overtly discuss 
domestic politics such the governing coalition’s position on economic issues, the poster 
themes raised by the Greens were quite vague and largely parallel to their domestic 
environmental platform. One featured a mushroom cloud and the slogan “for a Europe 
without mushroom clouds.” A second showed tomatoes and the saying “good foods, not 
genetically modified foods.;” A third featured the Greens’ national party symbol, a daisy, 
and the slogan “for a better climate in Europe.” 
 
In contrast to the above parties, the remaining mainstream parties ran typically-
domestically oriented campaigns. Most nationally-oriented of all was the CDU’s 
campaign. Their main slogan was “Germany can do better” (Deutschland kann mehr), 
often accompanied by images of the party’s head – and presumed candidate for 
Chancellor in 2006 – Angela Merkel. She was not an MEP candidate. One Christian 
Democratic campaign poster featured the image of a red (social democratic) and green 
apple with a worm coming out of it. Another showed a heart-shaped piece of gingerbread, 
with “trust me” written on it, broken in half and headlined with the slogan “love was red 
and hope was green.” A third asserted, “Better for Germany: Vote against Red-Green 
Chaos in the June 13 European Election.” CDU campaign brochures featured unflattering 
comparisons of German unemployment, school quality, and apprenticeship programs 
before and after the SPD-Green coalition took office. The Christian Democrats’ only 
overtly European poster contained a picture of an older woman sitting alone on a bus and   29 
the slogan “for a secure Europe,” stressing not only the party’s call for increased EU 
spending on internal security but also their domestic law-and-order platform. Experience 
and polls made clear that the large, incumbent SPD, with its weak economic record, was 
vulnerable in this European election and the Christian Democrats did all they could to 
portray the EP election as a referendum on the incumbent government.
15 
 
While the CDU, like the Social Democrats, did not plan to stress Turkish accession to the 
EU in its campaign, the need to counter the far right’s populist appeals on the topic 
combined with the opportunity to gain the support of some anti-Turkish SPD supporters 
helped the party overcome its divisions on the issue. In media appearances Christian 
Democrats stressed their plan for a “privileged partnership” rather than EU membership 
for Turkey. Ultimately, however, their statements regarding Turkey often moved into a 
discussion of the domestic role of Turkish immigrants living in Germany, a longstanding 
national political debate. 
 
The final opposition party, the PDS, pursued a similarly domestically-focused 
campaign.
16 Their most prominent campaign poster featured the slogan “Enough is 
Enough!” implicitly referring to the incumbents’ cuts to the German welfare state. 
Domestically, the PDS stressed an “Agenda Social” in contrast to the Schroeder 
                                                 
15 The CDU’s Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), unsurprisingly had a less nationally-
focused and more regionally-focused campaign. Its main slogan was “CSU – A Strong Voice for Bavaria in 
Brussels.” The CSU’s second focus in the campaign, however, was its opposition to Turkey’s membership 
in the EU. The party was more united on this front than the CDU and was happy to oblige the media’s 
interest in the issue. Some observers argued that the CSU stressed the Turkey issue rather than placing 
emphasis on the Red-Green government’s economic record as the CDU did in order to divert voter 
attention away from the CSU-led Bavarian government’s budget cutbacks (Schaeffer 2004). 
16 The PDS did, however, stress European themes in a poster calling for “Europe on the side of the UN, not 
in the shadow of the US.” Given the importance German voters placed on opposition to the war in Iraq this 
focus was sure to win votes nationally as well.   30 
government’s neo-liberal “Agenda 2010.” The former communists’ other European 
posters repeatedly stressed the need for a “Social Europe,” reinforcing their domestic 
campaign (Bortfeldt 2004). Given widespread voter concern about the future of the 
German welfare state and dissatisfaction with the red-green government’s performance in 
this regard, this thrust was likely to serve the PDS’s domestic agenda well.   
 
IV. Summary 
 
Thus, although the 2004 EP campaign in Germany was low-key compared to national 
contests, and although the Christian Democrats, former communists, and to a degree the 
Greens, stressed national rather than European issues, the campaign had more European 
content than the conventional wisdom on EP elections would expect. Furthermore, the 
parties that did not stress European issues did so not out of ignorance, fear, or stupidity, 
but because they thought they could perform well in both the EP campaign and 
subsequent domestic campaigns by criticizing Germany’s unpopular red-green 
government. (Or in the case of the Greens by playing up their popular Foreign Minister.) 
In addition, rather than being anomalies, the occasional stress on Europe in this campaign 
was a strategic decision by strategic parties trying to do well both in European and future 
national elections. The far right capitalized on its uniquely anti-EU, anti-Islamic position 
to protest voters. The SPD and to an extent the Greens tried to divert attention from their 
disastrous domestic record. Finally, the Free Democrats sought to play up its popular 
European candidate, rather than its fractured domestic leadership, while stressing its core 
domestic platform. The media forced all parties to address the question of Turkish EU   31 
membership, likely because this European theme was closely related to the broader high-
salience political debate in Germany regarding the role played by Turkish immigrants in 
German society. 
 
The content of these campaigns can best be explained not by the overall role of the 
European parliament, nor by German parties’ widespread consensus on European 
integration or their disagreement over Turkish membership, but rather by campaign 
managers’ strategic decisions about which issues would serve their parties best in 
domestic political competition and by the media’s estimation of what would attract 
readers or viewers.      32 
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